Dominion Disallowance of Provincial Legislation in Canada

Federal disallowance of Provincial Legislation has been a significant aspect of the Canada’s system of “federalism”, allowing the central government to nullify provincial acts deemed contrary to federal interests. This power, unique to Canada, contrasts with the American federal system, reflecting a “differing approach” to federalism. From 1867 to 1935, the Dominion government disallowed at least 114 provincial acts and territorial ordinances, highlighting its considerable powers over provincial legislation.

The process of disallowance involved the submission of provincial acts to the governor-general, with the governor-general in council having the authority to disallow them, typically based on recommendations from the Ministry of Justice, in the same way colonies previous to Confederation would submit their legislation through Lieuitenant Governors to the Crown. Disallowance had to occur within one year of receiving the act. While the British government couldn’t directly interfere with provincial acts after confederation, it could express its concerns to the Dominion government instead, as could other foreign governments.

The reasons for disallowance varied widely, including conflicts with federal legislation, exceeding provincial powers outlined in the British North America Act, violation of treaty rights, or infringement on individual rights and property. The subjects of disallowed acts ranged from immigration and banking to mining and liquor regulation, indicating the Dominion’s broad oversight.

Historically, the frequency of disallowance fluctuated, with peaks in the late 19th and early 20th centuries followed by a decline in recent years. Initially, the crown and its Federal government, themselves involved in a parent-child relationship, viewed a strong central government as necessary, akin to a parent-child relationship with provinces. Evolving interpretations of “Canadian federalism” have more recently emphasized provincial rights and autonomy, more in keeping with the American meaning of the term.

Decisions by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and advocacy for provincial rights led to a shift in attitudes toward disallowance. Provinces began to assert their legislative independence, advocating for minimal federal interference. By the early 20th century, calls for disallowance were expected to be justified by clear attempts to infringe on federal jurisdiction.


“Although there is a federal form of government in both the Dominion of Canada. and the United States, there are striking differences in the two types of federalism. Some of these differences are to be found in fundamentals, such as the basis upon which the powers of government are divided in the two countries. Less striking, but nevertheless significant, are still other points of variance. Among these is the power which the dominion government has to disallow legislative acts of the provinces. Just why the fathers of the Canadian federation thought this power should be given to the central government is not clear. The fact remains, however, that in the years from 1867 to 1935, at least 114 provincial acts and territorial ordinances were set aside. It is important to note that these acts were dis- allowed by executive officers of the dominion government. Executive officers of the national government in the United States do not possess similar powers where state legislation is concerned.”

“A survey of the law-making efforts of provincial legislatures which have been set aside by the dominion government indicates that the central government has interfered with some of the most important fields in which provincial legislation might be enacted.”

“The frequency with which the dominion’s power of disallowance has been used has varied considerably at different periods in Canada’s history. In the years from 1867 through 1895, no less than 72 acts and ordinances were set aside. In the years from 1896 through 1920, a period of almost equal length, 37 provincial acts and ordinances were annulled. From 1920 to 1935, only five acts passed by provincial legislatures fell before the disapproval of the dominion government. In the first period mentioned, the greatest number of acts to be disallowed in one province was 26, in Manitoba. British Columbia, with 20, was a close second. Seven ordinances (as distinct from legislative acts) were set aside in the Northwest Territory, while in Ontario and Nova Scotia six acts in each province were disallowed. The remainder of the 72 can be accounted for by the disallowance of four statutes in Quebec, two in Prince Edward Island, and one in New Brunswick. In the second period, British Columbia headed the list with 22, while Manitoba and Saskatchewan had three each. Ontario and Quebec each had one act annulled. Seven ordinances were set aside, five in the Yukon Territory and two in the Northwest Territory. Since 1920, legislative acts in only three provinces have been disallowed. Three were annulled in Nova Scotia and one each in Alberta and British Columbia.”

“To many Americans, it is, of course, striking that the central government in a federation should possess this degree of control over certain types of legislation enacted by the member units in that federal organization. In the Canada of 1864-66, however, there were many who, like J. A. Macdonald, wished to see a strong central government created. They believed that the war between the states to the south of them was due, in part, to weakness at the center. That the dominion government should be able to disallow provincial legislation did not seem strange to them.”

Heneman, H. J. (1937). Dominion Disallowance of Provincial Legislation in Canada. The American Political Science Review, 31(1), 92–96. https://doi.org/10.2307/1948049

One Nation Under Court: The Supreme Court and Canadian Federalism

“In each of the four references the Court was presented with at least two distinct visions of the Canadian federation: a centralist, a provincialist, a dualist and a multinational. The first two visions are indicative of a mono-national conception of Canada, and the latter two of a plural-national conception. The Court, in being asked to resolve the conflict between the federal and provincial governments in the Senate and Patriation References, or between the federal and Quebec governments in the Quebec Veto and Secession References, was asked, in effect, to choose between these conflicting visions. And, in rendering an opinion that implicitly gave precedence to one or other of these visions, it elaborated a conception of Canada. In this paper I argue that in all four references, the SCC, acting as mediator, expanded upon a particular vision of the Canadian federation reflecting a mono-national conception of Canada, even when faced with an alternative plural-national conception. In this way, the Court emphasized the imperative need for “one Canada” at the expense of the constitutional expression of nationhood outside the nation.”

“Under the mono-national approach, the Canadian nation is understood as a ‘polyethnic’ entity comprised of many ethno-cultural groups which, though they subscribe to a common national identity, still express a multiplicity of values that distinguish them from other groups. These divisions remain important and are recognized formally and informally by the state. In other words, the Canadian nation still recognizes cultural diversity through various judicial, legislative, or even constitutional concessions despite its overarching commitment to the unity of the political nation. ”

“While it may be true that the Court in all four references rendered balanced decisions by recognizing the role of both orders of government, it is also true that the Court reaffirmed a particular conception of the nation, one that asserts the idea of ‘one Canada’. In the Senate Reference, the SCC affirmed the legitimacy of the Senate as a federally appointed institution that secures regional representation at the centre within the federal policy-making institutions by arguing that the Senate, as is – an appointed body acting as a chamber of sober second thought – cannot be altered unilaterally by any one order of government. As a result of this opinion, the SCC seemingly strengthened the position of the provinces in the federation in two ways: first, the Senate must continue to exist because it ensures regional representation at the centre, a key federal principle; second, abolition of this institution affects federal-provincial relations, thus the provinces must be consulted and their consent obtained. In actuality however, this decision, though it did not constitutionally strengthen the position of the federal government vis-à-vis the provinces and central institutions, did reinforce and legitimize this position politically by assuring that the Senate remains a body appointed solely by the federal government. The Court did not expand upon why the Senate must continue to be appointed to perform its legislative function or if the Senate performed its function in practice – it simply stated that it must.”

Verrelli, Nadia. “One Nation Under Court: The Supreme Court and Canadian Federalism”. https://www.academia.edu/6328236/ONE_NATION_UNDER_COURT_THE_SUPREME_COURT_AND_CANADIAN_FEDERALISM

Constitutional Conventions and Written Constitutions: The Rule of Law Implications in Canada

The paper explores the significance of the rule of law in the Canadian Constitution, particularly focusing on its complex relationship with constitutional conventions and the practical functioning of governance. It highlights the preamble of the Charter of Rights, emphasizing Canada’s foundation on the supremacy of God and the rule of law. Despite this, the text argues that political actors often ignore the law, citing the incomplete and outdated framework of the formal constitution as a contributing factor.

Furthermore, it discusses the role of the Supreme Court of Canada in emphasizing the rule of law in its decisions since the incorporation of the Charter, indicating its fundamental importance. However, it questions whether Canada genuinely upholds the rule of law when conventions allow politicians to bypass or even contradict legal mandates.

The text delves into the historical context of Canada’s constitutional framework, particularly its roots in British constitutional principles. It examines the powers vested in the Governor General and the Queen, highlighting the discrepancy between formal legal structures and practical governance.

Moreover, it discusses the role of conventions in Canadian constitutional law, acknowledging their importance in interpreting the constitution to reflect contemporary societal values. The text argues for a shift towards a substantive conception of the rule of law, incorporating unwritten constitutional principles to bridge the gap between formal legal structures and practical governance realities.


“The rule of law has come to occupy hallowed ground in the Canadian Constitution. After all, the preamble to the Charter of Rights is composed of one line: ‘Whereas Canada is founded upon the principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law.’ The rule of law is presumed to be a foundational principle of any democratic polity and, depending on how it is defined, perhaps even of many non-democratic regimes as well. While later discussion will reveal the complexity of competing conceptions of the rule of law, at a minimum it would seem to require that those who govern a society are bound by the law of the land and conversely that the law itself should reflect how government power is exercised. And yet, Canada shares an ironic situation with many other countries with written Constitutions: the rule of law is praised while political actors ignore the law. Constitutional conventions at times permit, and on occasion require, public officials to act in ways other than what is detailed in law. In Canada’s case, at least, this situation is both necessitated and exacerbated by the incomplete and archaic framework of the formal law of the constitution.”

“The Supreme Court of Canada has made some mention of the rule of law in 217 decisions in the 32 years since its incorporation in the Charter’s preamble. This contrasts with a mere eight decisions that referred to the rule of law in the 32 years prior to the Charter. The permeation of the concept through so many recent judicial reasons indicates a fundamental recognition of the principle’s importance. Given that prominence, it is worth asking whether Canada does in fact respect the rule of law when convention frees political actors – and sometimes requires them – to ignore the law in a number of settings.”

“When the Dominion of Canada was created in 1867, much of the legislative framework created in the British North America Act 1867 was incomplete and based on unwritten constitutional understandings about responsible government then prevalent in Britain. The opening preamble to the Act began:

‘WHEREAS the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have expressed their Desire to be federally united into One Dominion under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom…’ As we shall see later in this paper, the Supreme Court of Canada has come to place much reliance on this nebulous reference to ‘a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom’.”

[“A Constitution similar in principle to that of the UK” strikes me as a kind of oppositional parallel to the guarantee of a republican form of government offered to the States in the US Constitution, oppositional because they are crown representatives in Canada supporting a network of disallowance imposed without any popular will, either through ratification by vote or with representatives chosen by vote for their separate, constitutional, plenary power role in “confederation”. They were never and can never be vessels of the public will or implements of popular sovereignty, no matter what color they are, what country they originally hail from, or what “marginalized communities” they appeal to.

This soft-coup mechanism has been useful time and time again now that it has been established and legitimized that Canadian subjects need not be consulted for monumental constitutional change, it’s further compounded at the sub-national level with the lack of a written constitution as is the case in Nova Scotia, “the people” rest on a foundation of sand. People can vote for a crown representative but that doesn’t make them the people’s representative. People can participate in political parties but they are proprietary in the sense they aren’t like other corporate bodies in law as voluntary associations. “The People” are nowhere to be found except as the most rudimentary propulsion in making a singular mark at an “election” whose results can be rearranged after the fact by an executive we can’t vote for or impeach.]

“The Constitution Act 1867 declares that the executive power is vested in the Queen (s 9). It goes on to ascribe a range of specific powers to the Governor General without mentioning how that position is filled. The appointment of the Governor General is actually achieved under Letters Patent, last issued in 1947, under the Great Seal of Canada; those Letters Patent may be revoked or amended at any time by the Queen, but presumably with Canadian ministerial involvement as they guard the use of the Seal. There is to be a Queen’s Privy Council for Canada ‘to aid and advise in the Government of Canada’, whose members are appointed and may be removed at any time by the Governor General (s 11). The privy councillors’ uncertain tenure is compounded by their subservience under Article IX of the Letters Patent, which ‘require[s] and command[s]’ ministers ‘to be obedient, aiding, and assisting unto Our Governor General’. The Commander-in-Chief of Canadian military forces is stipulated to be the Queen by the Constitution Act 1867 (s 15), although the Governor General fulfills this role under the 1947 Letters Patent (art I). The Governor General is given the power to appoint Senators under the Constitution Act 1867 (ss 24, 32), to appoint the Speaker of the Senate (s 34), and to recommend to the Queen that she appoint on occasion either four or eight extra Senators beyond the normal numbers (s 26). The Governor General also appoints the judges of provincial superior courts (s 96). The Governor General also has a vital role to play in the legislative process. The Governor General has the power to summon, prorogue, and dissolve parliament.

Any ‘Vote, Resolution, Address, or Bill for the Appropriation of any Part of the Public Revenue, or of any Tax or Impost’ must be recommended by the Governor General before the House of Commons may approve them (s 53). And, although the Queen is the formal font of the lawmaking powers of Parliament(s 91), the sovereign’s functional roles in legislation are exercised in practice by the Governor General.

Section 55 stipulates:
Where a Bill passed by the Houses of Parliament is presented to the Governor General for the Queen’s Assent, he shall declare, according to his Discretion, but subject to the Provisions of this Act and to Her Majesty’s Instructions, either that he assents thereto in the Queen’s name, or that he withholds the Queen’s Assent, or that here serves the Bill for the Signification of the Queen’s Pleasure.
Thus the Governor General retains complete discretion in law to approve or veto bills passed by the two houses of parliament, or even to reserve the bill for the British government to decide whether to approve. Remnants of colonial subservience still remain in the Constitution Act 1867 with the duty imposed on the Governor General to send copies of all bills given royal assent to the UK government. Furthermore, on the advice of the British government, the Queen may disallow any Act passed by the Canadian Parliament.

Section 56 reads:
Where the Governor General assents to a Bill in the Queen’s Name, he shall by the first convenient Opportunity send an authentic Copy of the Act to one of Her Majesty’s Principal Secretaries of State, and if the Queen in Council within Two Years after the Receipt thereof by the Secretary of State thinks fit to disallow the Act, such Disallowance (with a Certificate of the Secretary of State of the Day on which the Act was received by him) being signified by the Governor General, by Speech or Message to each of the Houses of the Parliament or by Proclamation, shall annul the Act from and after the Day of Such Signification.
If the Governor General has formally reserved a bill for the British government to advise the Queen on, it cannot become law unless the Governor General proclaims within two years that it has received royal assent from the Queen in Council (s 57). Another aspect in which the Constitution does not match reality lies in the powers of the Senate in the legislative process. The Senate was created as an essentially equal partner with the House of Commons, as the approval of both houses is required for bills to be presented for royal assent (s 91). The only impediment on the Senate is that certain financial bills may only originate in the House of Commons (s 53). The Constitution also contains some serious lacunae in not mentioning pivotal actors. Given their importance, it may seem curious at first that such key actors as the Prime Minister and cabinet were not explicitly mentioned in the original Constitution. The Prime Minister was not even mentioned in constitutional statutes until the Constitution Act 1982 imposed duties on the Prime Minister to convene conferences to discuss particular issues in ss 35.1, 37 (now repealed), and 49. Although Cabinet is functionally the most powerful political institution, it has not been mentioned in Canadian constitutional documents. It is a committee of the much larger Privy Council, and by convention only those members of the Privy Council who belong to the cabinet are normally entitled to participate in the affairs of state.

Modern parliamentary democracy depends almost entirely on political parties to give its structure, both in the conduct of elections, the formation and operation of governments, and virtually all the proceedings in the legislatures.
And yet political parties are essentially unknown in Canadian law outside of electoral legislation and the rules governing parliamentary process. Not only are parties not mentioned in the formal Constitution, they remain in law voluntary associations with very limited capacity to sue or be sued. Even so, important conventions and understandings about party discipline, as well as the control of parliamentary process and assignments by party leaders, define the essential character of modern parliamentary government.

The subjugation of the provincial level of government to the federal authority is also enshrined in powers accorded the Governor General in the formal Constitution. The Lieutenant Governors are appointed by, and may be instructed and removed, by the Governor General (s.58 & s.59). They fill the same roles in provincial government as the Governor General at the national level. And provincial legislation faces the same legal uncertainties after the members of the assembly have passed a bill, as do bills passed by the House of Commons and Senate. Subject to instruction from the Governor General, the Lieutenant Governors may grant or refuse assent to bills passed by their assembly, as well as reserve a bill for the Governor General’s consideration(s 90). Within one year of a bill being reserved, the Governor General in Council can decide whether it should be granted assent. Furthermore, even bills which have been granted royal assent by the Lieutenant Governor are subject to being disallowed by the Governor General in Council. For the first half of Canada’s existence, these powers of reservation and disallowance were very live powers indeed. A total of 70 bills were reserved by Lieutenant Governors, and only 14 were subsequently granted assent by the Governor General. In addition, the federal government had disallowed a further 112 Acts granted royal assent by the Lieutenant Governors by the time of the last instance in 1943. These arrangements are among the reasons why KC Wheare characterised Canada as only having a quasi-federal Constitution.”

“Before accepting a role for convention in constitutional law, however, one needs to address the single most important set of objections to judicial inclusion of convention within the broad tent of constitutional interpretation: the malleable, disputed, and indeterminate character of many conventional rules.Undoubtedly some conventions are vague at best, while others have been ignored without substantive repercussions. But it is a far cry both logically and evidentially to conclude from the vagueness, controversy, and inconsistent observance of some conventions that all conventions are indeterminate, disputed, or inconsequential. That conclusion would simply be a factual error, because there are a number of conventions whose terms are quite clear, almost universally accepted, and invariably respected by political actors. For example, there is no doubt that Canadian governors may not personally decide to refuse royal assent to bills, or reserve them for consideration by others. While some conventions might not be suitable for judicial consideration, others may be indispensable to interpreting the Constitution in ways that reflect what is considered legitimate in contemporary society.It is possible to identify different types of conventions based on four related elements: the degree of importance of the constitutional principle which justifies the convention, the level of agreement on that principle, the precision with which the terms of the rule can be expressed, and how significantly the convention impacts the principle involved. With different combinations of those factors, conventions will vary according to the degree of consensus that supports them, the effect their breach or total absence will have upon the constitution, and the degree of flexibility political actors have in complying with them.”

“Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Canada appears to have abandoned a formal conception of the rule of law and embraced a substantive conception, where fundamental principles and values determine how the law can be interpreted. Such a conclusion may be the inevitable response to a glaring lack of congruence between Canada’s constitutional law as it appears in the formal documents of the Constitution, on the one hand, and the very different ways in which the powers of government are expected to operate in practice, on the other. The embrace of unwritten constitutional principles into the legal structure of the Constitution is the most practical response to a body of supreme law that cannot legitimately operate or be enforced as written. The identification and inclusion of the most important categories of constitutional conventions also appears to be a logical and necessary step to ensure the Constitution reflects reality and to resolve Canada’s rule of law dilemma.”

Heard, Andrew. “Constitutional Conventions and Written Constitutions: The Rule of Law Implications in Canada.” Vol 38 No 2 2015, 2015. https://www.academia.edu/28228004/Constitutional_Conventions_and_Written_Constitutions_The_Rule_of_Law_Implications_in_Canada

Cod Fisheries: The History of an International Economy – The Rise of Nova Scotia, 1783-1838; Nova Scotia and Confederation, 1838-1886

“You will further perceive, by the Commercial arrangements which have since taken place between the two Countries, that our Parent State evinces a determination to prevent all foreign interference with the welfare of her Colo­nies. The British-North-American Provinces will, consequently, be enabled to supply our West-India Islands with fish and lumber, without the dread of any competition from their American neighbors in these branches of com­merce. Prospects so encouraging will, I doubt not, be taken advantage of by the industries and enterprising inhabitants of Nova Scotia.

Address of the Lieutenant-Governor, Nova Scotia, 1816″


“The youth of the province are daily quitting the fishing stations, and seeking
employment on board United States vessels, conducting them to the best fish­ing grounds, carrying on trade and traffic for their new employers with the inhabitants, and injuring their native country by defrauding its revenue, diminishing the operative class, and leaving the aged and infirm to burthen the community they have forsaken and deserted. Journals of the Assembly, Nova Scotia, 1837.”

Innis, Harold A. Cod Fisheries: The History of an International Economy. University of Toronto Press, 1954. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3138/j.ctv5j037r.

“The Rise of Nova Scotia, 1783-1838, Nova Scotia and Confederation, 1838-1886”.
https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.3138/9781487586256-013/html, https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.3138/9781487586256-015/pdf

Constitutional Conventions, The Heart of the Living Constitution


Constitutional conventions significantly shape how Canada’s constitution functions, often filling legal gaps and defining political authority. They govern the prime minister’s role and the operation of responsible government, transferring decision-making authority from legal frameworks to political actors. Conventions also restrict the legitimate use of legal powers, as seen with the governor general’s limited discretion in appointing cabinet members. Interestingly, some conventions contradict legal duties, like the governor general’s failure to send legislation copies to the British government since 1942. Despite their importance, Canadian courts and scholars have overlooked conventions, misunderstanding their nature and origin.

Relying on historical precedents in constitutional matters can be effective, but problematic when in conflict. Political precedents might be absent, outdated, or contradictory, leading to dilemmas about the existence and interpretation of rules. The Jennings test, often used to determine conventions’ binding nature, works best for those arising from consistent political practice. Trudeau’s attempt to unilaterally patriate the constitution highlights the tension between unilateralism and constitutional conventions, demonstrating the complexities of internal morality in governance.


“Constitutional conventions play a key role in how our constitution actually works in practice, redefining the operation of many legal rules in the process. Some conventions fill great vacuums in the law; for example, the office of prime minister remains to this day largely a creation of convention rather than law. Indeed, the whole enterprise of responsible government is essentially defined by convention.

Other conventions transfer political authority for decisions away from the legal decision maker; most of the powers of the governor general and lieutenant governors, for instance, are exercised in practice by the prime minister and cabinet. Some conventional rules limit the circumstances in which a legal power may legitimately be used; the governor general’s power to appoint and replace members of the cabinet at will are strongly circumscribed and must be used to ensure that the incumbents have or are likely to win the confidence of the House of Commons. A few conventions even negate legal powers or duties; while the governor general has a clear duty under s.56 of the Constitution Act, 1867 to send copies of all legislation passed by Parliament to the British government, this duty has not been followed since 1942. Given the central role of conventions to the Canadian system of government, it is perhaps curious that Canadian courts and legal scholars have given relatively little consideration to them. Of more concern, however, is that much of the attention that has been paid to conventions seriously misconstrues their nature and genesis.”

“A reliance on historical precedents is a bit like trying to navigate by the stars. It is all well and good in a clear sky, but the heavens are not always obliging. The sky may be entirely clouded over, or large patches of the sky may be covered. Similarly, political precedents work wonderfully when they exist and when one can tell which precedents are relevant to our constitutional navigation. But historical precedents can be completely missing, date from a bygone era, or contradict one another. If one searches for a rule among historical events, a number of dilemmas arise from conflicting precedents. Does the contradictory evidence demonstrate that no binding rule exists? Is there a rule, but is one or more of the actors mistaken in assessing its terms? Did one rule give way to another higher rule? Finally, did the actors knowingly breach the rule, but publicly deny its existence, as an act of political self-interest? Another issue is whether one considers both positive and negative precedents. Sometimes, what did not happen and why can be just as revealing, or even more so, than what has happened. It is quite erroneous to conclude that the absence of a clear line of consistent precedents demonstrates that political actors are not bound by convention.The Jennings test really works best for those conventions which arise from consistent political practice and develop into convention. While many conventions do arise this way, others do not. As noted below, conventions can arise through express agreement among all the relevant actors or even by unilateral declaration. Quite a few conventions are also the result of inconsistent, antiquated, or only missing precedents.”

[Unilateralism – it seems very “Canadian” that they’d give “dictatorship” a new name and then legitimize it as a political tradition. Unilateralism is a political tradition but usually in an international context, that each province relates to each other as foreign in many ways is apparent in the way “federalism” has been redefined in the Canadian context, such as with what “free trade” has been redefined to mean. Everything has its exception.]

“Pierre Trudeau’s attempted unilateral patriation is an excellent example of conventions as critical morality. Despite Trudeau’s avowed defence of unilateralism at the time of his proposal, the larger political community and a majority of the Supreme Court clearly held that unilateral changes to provincial powers unconstitutionally undermined the federal principle. Perhaps more telling about the perils of relying on internal morality, Pierre Trudeau pursued the unilateral patriation of the Constitution despite the fact that, as he later acknowledged, he knew there to be a convention requiring provincial consent. After the Supreme Court published their decision in the Patriation Reference, Trudeau told reporters that the Court simply confirmed what the government had held all along, that it had the legal authority to proceed unilaterally even “though there is a political convention or practice that such a request not be made without the agreement of the provincial governments.”

“Constitutional Conventions, The Heart of the Living Constitution”, Heard Andrew. https://www.academia.edu/26337220/Constitutional_Conventions_The_Heart_of_the_Living_Constitution

Education in Nova Scotia before 1811

“In 1792, 400 acres (were set apart for school purposes) at Dartmouth… By surveys conducted in 1813 previous land grants for schools were supplemented by an addition of 4,625 acres comprising tracts in twelve settlements in different parts of the province. These latter parcels of land were made in favor of the Chief Justice of the province to be held in trust by the Bishop and the Secretary.

These land concessions for school purposes were made in conformity with the agreement of the Lords of Trade with the S. P. G. in 1749; the Royal Orders issued to Governor Cornwallis in 1749, and the more recent instructions given Governor Lawrence in 1756 authorizing him to reserve “a particular spot in or near each town for the building of a church and four hundred acres adjacent thereto for the maintenance of a minister and two hundred acres for a schoolmaster;” and to retain, likewise, over and above the stated amount, one hundred acres in each township free of quit rent for ten years, for the use of all schoolmasters sent out by the Society. Prior to 1766 ministers of the Church of England exercised a sort of guardianship over the school plots lying in their respective parishes pending their occupation by duly appointed teachers.

But because of a school law passed by the Nova Scotia Legislature in that year administration of all school lands in the province was vested in a board of trustees endowed with corporate powers. Usually the ministers of the parishes in which the lands were situated and the church wardens were named trustees. From this circumstance, partly, the view came to prevail that the original intention was to reserve these lands exclusively for the benefit of S.P.G. teachers although there had been no express agreement to that effect.”

Thibeau, Patrick Wilfrid, 1892-. “Education In Nova Scotia Before 1811 …” Washington, D.C., 1922. https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001065201

A Reassessment of City/County Consolidation: Economic Development Impacts

“Over the past two decades, a large body of literature has examined the fiscal consequences of city/ county consolidation. Much of this research suggests that consolidation results in expansions in local budgets and in the scope and quality of municipal services (Erie, Kirlin, and Rabinovitz 1972; Benton and Gamble 1984; Seamon and Feiock 1995).

Recent studies suggest that consolidation also benefits local economic development efforts (Owen 1992; Rusk 1993; Savitch and Vogel 1995). Unlike these public-sector tax and expenditure effects, the impact of consolidation on overall local economic conditions has not been subjected to systematic empirical tests.

This research note begins to fill this lacuna by building on Benton and Gamble’s analysis (1984) of the effect of consolidation on taxes and expenditures in Jacksonville, Florida. We employ a similar design, but also include private-sector growth and use a Box-Tiao time-series model (Box and Tiao 1975), together with more contemporary data to identify the overall economic development effects of a city/county merger.”

R. Feiock, Jered B. Carr | Sep 1 1997 | Economics | State and Local Government Review https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/A-Reassessment-of-City%2FCounty-Consolidation%3A-Feiock-Carr/62d102b10f0255f3e5af43949e46be0281fad5f3

Frame the Consolidation Debate with a Sound Argument: A Reply to a Response

“The most persuasive argument in favor of city–county consolidation has been—and remains—economic development through the formation of a strong and attractive regional community identity. Empirical evidence consistently demonstrates that appeals to voters based on reducing inner-city/suburban socioeconomic inequity and enhancing administrative efficiency are a recipe for failed consolidation campaigns.”

Published in Public Administration Review | K. Thurmaier | 2006 https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Frame-the-Consolidation-Debate-with-a-Sound-A-Reply-Thurmaier-Leland/e045cf81ff4dcc57dfea0e07b3271df433be31ba

When Cities Get Married

This might be the most intersectional or “woke” take on urban studies I’ve seen yet. That it’s from 2004 is surprising, first wave woke, an early adopter certainly in terms of the topic of municipal consolidation.
Marriage is a union, the basis of the family unit in the ideal and a solemn contractual obligation, that it’s used in regard to local government, rule of law and the conduct of individual cities as political units seems completely appropriate. Self government as a gift to bestow on future generations, a democratic inheritance that represents both freedom and responsibility, concerns that certainly align with progeny and lineage along with other aspects of the familial frame.


“We argue that consolidation is represented in gendered and sexualized terms so that the question of municipal expansion became insulated from moral, racialized, and environmental concerns about the “threats” of the big city. Our analysis has contemporary relevance because it suggests the sexist and heterosexist norms that may be embedded in the noblesse oblige of contemporary municipal consolidation. It also suggests a way of looking at contemporary municipal boundary changes through a normative lens that takes us beyond economic notions of self-interest.”

In this article, we examine the processes by which urban space became sexually coded through municipal consolidation in the nineteenth century. Our analysis covers the union of Van Vorst Township to Jersey City in 1851 and the absorption of the City of Brooklyn to “Greater New York” in 1898. In both cases, urban space was gendered and sexualized through courtship and marriage metaphors used by local newspapers.

Published in Urban Affairs Review | Richardson Dilworth | 2004 https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/When-Cities-Get-Married-Dilworth-Trevenen/a2ca8f17cce491477a6811e6fa66874c7a7820fe

Voting in City-County Consolidation Referenda

Voter acceptances of city-county consolidations have been few. Since the end of World War II, consolidation has been attempted twenty-four times and has succeeded only in Baton Rouge, Nashville, Jacksonville, Columbus and in three Virginia areas. The difficulty of obtaining voter support for consolidation has now become part of Political Science conventional Wisdom.

The case-study literature on city-county consolidation has offered many reasons for its lack of success. Among reasons offered were: lack of grass-roots support, participation of few mass-based interest groups, voter apathy, and the relative satisfaction with existing governmental arrangements and services. Public officials and the “power structure” are rarely the initiators of city-county consolidations. The case-study literature also offers contradictory reasons concerning factors which affect support levels in consolidations.

Although the case-study literature offers many reasons for lack of voter support for consolidation, there have been few systematic comparative examinations of consolidation referenda. In fact the literature indicates that unusual and situational factors accompanied the successful consolidations. Brett Hawkin’s study shows that non-transportable circumstances made the Nashville-Davidson success sui generis. Nashville’s raising of taxes, aggressive annexation policy, and the institution of a “green sticker tax” on all automobiles using city streets all contributed to consolidation success. Grand jury indictments of ten local officials and the disacreditation of the local schools triggered success in Jacksonville-Duval. Thomas Scott has argued that each successful consolidation must be treated as a deviant case and that abnormal circumstances were involved in the successful consolidations.”

Published in Political Research Quarterly | V. L. Marando | 1973 https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Voting-in-City-County-Consolidation-Referenda-Marando/b3d116e06a23ab60507655cd6911d927faf9eb01
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