The Writings of Thomas Jefferson

“TO WILLIAM CARMICHAEL. Paris, November 4, 1785.:

A fracas, which has lately happened in Boston, becoming a serious matter, I will give you the details of it, as transmitted to Mr. Adams in depositions. A Captain Stanhope, commanding the frigate Mercury, was sent with a convoy of vessels from Nova Scotia to Boston, to get a supply of provisions for that colony. It had happened, that two persons living near Boston, of the names of Dunbar and Lowthorp, had been taken prisoners during the war, and transferred from one vessel to another, till they were placed on board Stanhope’s ship. He treated them most cruelly, whipping them frequently, in order to make them do duty against their country, as sailors, on board his ship. The ship going to Antigua to refit, he put all his prisoners into jail, first giving Dunbar twenty-four lashes. Peace took place, and the prisoners got home under the general liberation. These men were quietly pursuing their occupations at home, when they heard that Stanhope was in Boston. Their indignation was kindled. They immediately went there, and, meeting Stanhope walking in the mall, Dunbar stepped up to him, and asked him if he recollected him, and the whipping him on board his ship. Having no weapon in his hand, he struck at Stanhope with his fist. Stanhope stepped back and drew his sword. The people interposed, and guarded him to the door of a Mr. Morton, to which he retreated. There, Dunbar again attempted to seize him; but the high sheriff had by this time arrived, who interposed and protected him. The assailants withdrew, and here ended all appearance of force. But Captain Stanhope thought proper to write to the Governor, which brought on the correspondence published in the papers of Europe. Lest you should not have seen it, I enclose it, as cut from a London paper; though not perfectly exact, it is substantially so. You will doubtless judge, that Governor Bowdoin referred him properly to the laws for redress, as he was obliged to do, and as would have been done in England, in a like case. Had he applied to the courts, the question would have been, whether they would have punished Dunbar? This must be answered now by conjecture only; and, to form that conjecture, every man must ask himself whether he would not have done as Dunbar did? And whether the people should not have permitted him to return to Stanhope the twenty-four lashes? This affair has been stated in the London papers, without mixing with it one circumstance of truth. …”

https://gutenberg.org/files/45847/45847-h/45847-h.htm#Page_473


“TO JOHN ADAMS. Paris, November 19, 1785.:

Is it impossible to persuade our countrymen to make peace with the Nova Scotians? I am persuaded nothing is wanting but advances on our part; and that it is in our power to draw off the greatest proportion of that settlement, and thus to free ourselves from rivals who may become of consequence. We are at present co-operating with Great Britain, whose policy it is to give aliment to that bitter enmity between her States and ours, which may secure her against their ever joining us. But would not the existence of a cordial friendship between us and them, be the best bridle we could possibly put into the mouth of England? …”

https://gutenberg.org/files/45847/45847-h/45847-h.htm#Page_488

“The Writings of Thomas Jefferson”. H. A. Washington. 1861 https://www.gutenberg.org/files/45847/45847-h/45847-h.htm

Constitutional Conventions and Written Constitutions: The Rule of Law Implications in Canada

The paper explores the significance of the rule of law in the Canadian Constitution, particularly focusing on its complex relationship with constitutional conventions and the practical functioning of governance. It highlights the preamble of the Charter of Rights, emphasizing Canada’s foundation on the supremacy of God and the rule of law. Despite this, the text argues that political actors often ignore the law, citing the incomplete and outdated framework of the formal constitution as a contributing factor.

Furthermore, it discusses the role of the Supreme Court of Canada in emphasizing the rule of law in its decisions since the incorporation of the Charter, indicating its fundamental importance. However, it questions whether Canada genuinely upholds the rule of law when conventions allow politicians to bypass or even contradict legal mandates.

The text delves into the historical context of Canada’s constitutional framework, particularly its roots in British constitutional principles. It examines the powers vested in the Governor General and the Queen, highlighting the discrepancy between formal legal structures and practical governance.

Moreover, it discusses the role of conventions in Canadian constitutional law, acknowledging their importance in interpreting the constitution to reflect contemporary societal values. The text argues for a shift towards a substantive conception of the rule of law, incorporating unwritten constitutional principles to bridge the gap between formal legal structures and practical governance realities.


“The rule of law has come to occupy hallowed ground in the Canadian Constitution. After all, the preamble to the Charter of Rights is composed of one line: ‘Whereas Canada is founded upon the principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law.’ The rule of law is presumed to be a foundational principle of any democratic polity and, depending on how it is defined, perhaps even of many non-democratic regimes as well. While later discussion will reveal the complexity of competing conceptions of the rule of law, at a minimum it would seem to require that those who govern a society are bound by the law of the land and conversely that the law itself should reflect how government power is exercised. And yet, Canada shares an ironic situation with many other countries with written Constitutions: the rule of law is praised while political actors ignore the law. Constitutional conventions at times permit, and on occasion require, public officials to act in ways other than what is detailed in law. In Canada’s case, at least, this situation is both necessitated and exacerbated by the incomplete and archaic framework of the formal law of the constitution.”

“The Supreme Court of Canada has made some mention of the rule of law in 217 decisions in the 32 years since its incorporation in the Charter’s preamble. This contrasts with a mere eight decisions that referred to the rule of law in the 32 years prior to the Charter. The permeation of the concept through so many recent judicial reasons indicates a fundamental recognition of the principle’s importance. Given that prominence, it is worth asking whether Canada does in fact respect the rule of law when convention frees political actors – and sometimes requires them – to ignore the law in a number of settings.”

“When the Dominion of Canada was created in 1867, much of the legislative framework created in the British North America Act 1867 was incomplete and based on unwritten constitutional understandings about responsible government then prevalent in Britain. The opening preamble to the Act began:

‘WHEREAS the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have expressed their Desire to be federally united into One Dominion under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom…’ As we shall see later in this paper, the Supreme Court of Canada has come to place much reliance on this nebulous reference to ‘a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom’.”

[“A Constitution similar in principle to that of the UK” strikes me as a kind of oppositional parallel to the guarantee of a republican form of government offered to the States in the US Constitution, oppositional because they are crown representatives in Canada supporting a network of disallowance imposed without any popular will, either through ratification by vote or with representatives chosen by vote for their separate, constitutional, plenary power role in “confederation”. They were never and can never be vessels of the public will or implements of popular sovereignty, no matter what color they are, what country they originally hail from, or what “marginalized communities” they appeal to.

This soft-coup mechanism has been useful time and time again now that it has been established and legitimized that Canadian subjects need not be consulted for monumental constitutional change, it’s further compounded at the sub-national level with the lack of a written constitution as is the case in Nova Scotia, “the people” rest on a foundation of sand. People can vote for a crown representative but that doesn’t make them the people’s representative. People can participate in political parties but they are proprietary in the sense they aren’t like other corporate bodies in law as voluntary associations. “The People” are nowhere to be found except as the most rudimentary propulsion in making a singular mark at an “election” whose results can be rearranged after the fact by an executive we can’t vote for or impeach.]

“The Constitution Act 1867 declares that the executive power is vested in the Queen (s 9). It goes on to ascribe a range of specific powers to the Governor General without mentioning how that position is filled. The appointment of the Governor General is actually achieved under Letters Patent, last issued in 1947, under the Great Seal of Canada; those Letters Patent may be revoked or amended at any time by the Queen, but presumably with Canadian ministerial involvement as they guard the use of the Seal. There is to be a Queen’s Privy Council for Canada ‘to aid and advise in the Government of Canada’, whose members are appointed and may be removed at any time by the Governor General (s 11). The privy councillors’ uncertain tenure is compounded by their subservience under Article IX of the Letters Patent, which ‘require[s] and command[s]’ ministers ‘to be obedient, aiding, and assisting unto Our Governor General’. The Commander-in-Chief of Canadian military forces is stipulated to be the Queen by the Constitution Act 1867 (s 15), although the Governor General fulfills this role under the 1947 Letters Patent (art I). The Governor General is given the power to appoint Senators under the Constitution Act 1867 (ss 24, 32), to appoint the Speaker of the Senate (s 34), and to recommend to the Queen that she appoint on occasion either four or eight extra Senators beyond the normal numbers (s 26). The Governor General also appoints the judges of provincial superior courts (s 96). The Governor General also has a vital role to play in the legislative process. The Governor General has the power to summon, prorogue, and dissolve parliament.

Any ‘Vote, Resolution, Address, or Bill for the Appropriation of any Part of the Public Revenue, or of any Tax or Impost’ must be recommended by the Governor General before the House of Commons may approve them (s 53). And, although the Queen is the formal font of the lawmaking powers of Parliament(s 91), the sovereign’s functional roles in legislation are exercised in practice by the Governor General.

Section 55 stipulates:
Where a Bill passed by the Houses of Parliament is presented to the Governor General for the Queen’s Assent, he shall declare, according to his Discretion, but subject to the Provisions of this Act and to Her Majesty’s Instructions, either that he assents thereto in the Queen’s name, or that he withholds the Queen’s Assent, or that here serves the Bill for the Signification of the Queen’s Pleasure.
Thus the Governor General retains complete discretion in law to approve or veto bills passed by the two houses of parliament, or even to reserve the bill for the British government to decide whether to approve. Remnants of colonial subservience still remain in the Constitution Act 1867 with the duty imposed on the Governor General to send copies of all bills given royal assent to the UK government. Furthermore, on the advice of the British government, the Queen may disallow any Act passed by the Canadian Parliament.

Section 56 reads:
Where the Governor General assents to a Bill in the Queen’s Name, he shall by the first convenient Opportunity send an authentic Copy of the Act to one of Her Majesty’s Principal Secretaries of State, and if the Queen in Council within Two Years after the Receipt thereof by the Secretary of State thinks fit to disallow the Act, such Disallowance (with a Certificate of the Secretary of State of the Day on which the Act was received by him) being signified by the Governor General, by Speech or Message to each of the Houses of the Parliament or by Proclamation, shall annul the Act from and after the Day of Such Signification.
If the Governor General has formally reserved a bill for the British government to advise the Queen on, it cannot become law unless the Governor General proclaims within two years that it has received royal assent from the Queen in Council (s 57). Another aspect in which the Constitution does not match reality lies in the powers of the Senate in the legislative process. The Senate was created as an essentially equal partner with the House of Commons, as the approval of both houses is required for bills to be presented for royal assent (s 91). The only impediment on the Senate is that certain financial bills may only originate in the House of Commons (s 53). The Constitution also contains some serious lacunae in not mentioning pivotal actors. Given their importance, it may seem curious at first that such key actors as the Prime Minister and cabinet were not explicitly mentioned in the original Constitution. The Prime Minister was not even mentioned in constitutional statutes until the Constitution Act 1982 imposed duties on the Prime Minister to convene conferences to discuss particular issues in ss 35.1, 37 (now repealed), and 49. Although Cabinet is functionally the most powerful political institution, it has not been mentioned in Canadian constitutional documents. It is a committee of the much larger Privy Council, and by convention only those members of the Privy Council who belong to the cabinet are normally entitled to participate in the affairs of state.

Modern parliamentary democracy depends almost entirely on political parties to give its structure, both in the conduct of elections, the formation and operation of governments, and virtually all the proceedings in the legislatures.
And yet political parties are essentially unknown in Canadian law outside of electoral legislation and the rules governing parliamentary process. Not only are parties not mentioned in the formal Constitution, they remain in law voluntary associations with very limited capacity to sue or be sued. Even so, important conventions and understandings about party discipline, as well as the control of parliamentary process and assignments by party leaders, define the essential character of modern parliamentary government.

The subjugation of the provincial level of government to the federal authority is also enshrined in powers accorded the Governor General in the formal Constitution. The Lieutenant Governors are appointed by, and may be instructed and removed, by the Governor General (s.58 & s.59). They fill the same roles in provincial government as the Governor General at the national level. And provincial legislation faces the same legal uncertainties after the members of the assembly have passed a bill, as do bills passed by the House of Commons and Senate. Subject to instruction from the Governor General, the Lieutenant Governors may grant or refuse assent to bills passed by their assembly, as well as reserve a bill for the Governor General’s consideration(s 90). Within one year of a bill being reserved, the Governor General in Council can decide whether it should be granted assent. Furthermore, even bills which have been granted royal assent by the Lieutenant Governor are subject to being disallowed by the Governor General in Council. For the first half of Canada’s existence, these powers of reservation and disallowance were very live powers indeed. A total of 70 bills were reserved by Lieutenant Governors, and only 14 were subsequently granted assent by the Governor General. In addition, the federal government had disallowed a further 112 Acts granted royal assent by the Lieutenant Governors by the time of the last instance in 1943. These arrangements are among the reasons why KC Wheare characterised Canada as only having a quasi-federal Constitution.”

“Before accepting a role for convention in constitutional law, however, one needs to address the single most important set of objections to judicial inclusion of convention within the broad tent of constitutional interpretation: the malleable, disputed, and indeterminate character of many conventional rules.Undoubtedly some conventions are vague at best, while others have been ignored without substantive repercussions. But it is a far cry both logically and evidentially to conclude from the vagueness, controversy, and inconsistent observance of some conventions that all conventions are indeterminate, disputed, or inconsequential. That conclusion would simply be a factual error, because there are a number of conventions whose terms are quite clear, almost universally accepted, and invariably respected by political actors. For example, there is no doubt that Canadian governors may not personally decide to refuse royal assent to bills, or reserve them for consideration by others. While some conventions might not be suitable for judicial consideration, others may be indispensable to interpreting the Constitution in ways that reflect what is considered legitimate in contemporary society.It is possible to identify different types of conventions based on four related elements: the degree of importance of the constitutional principle which justifies the convention, the level of agreement on that principle, the precision with which the terms of the rule can be expressed, and how significantly the convention impacts the principle involved. With different combinations of those factors, conventions will vary according to the degree of consensus that supports them, the effect their breach or total absence will have upon the constitution, and the degree of flexibility political actors have in complying with them.”

“Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Canada appears to have abandoned a formal conception of the rule of law and embraced a substantive conception, where fundamental principles and values determine how the law can be interpreted. Such a conclusion may be the inevitable response to a glaring lack of congruence between Canada’s constitutional law as it appears in the formal documents of the Constitution, on the one hand, and the very different ways in which the powers of government are expected to operate in practice, on the other. The embrace of unwritten constitutional principles into the legal structure of the Constitution is the most practical response to a body of supreme law that cannot legitimately operate or be enforced as written. The identification and inclusion of the most important categories of constitutional conventions also appears to be a logical and necessary step to ensure the Constitution reflects reality and to resolve Canada’s rule of law dilemma.”

Heard, Andrew. “Constitutional Conventions and Written Constitutions: The Rule of Law Implications in Canada.” Vol 38 No 2 2015, 2015. https://www.academia.edu/28228004/Constitutional_Conventions_and_Written_Constitutions_The_Rule_of_Law_Implications_in_Canada

Cod Fisheries: The History of an International Economy – The Rise of Nova Scotia, 1783-1838; Nova Scotia and Confederation, 1838-1886

“You will further perceive, by the Commercial arrangements which have since taken place between the two Countries, that our Parent State evinces a determination to prevent all foreign interference with the welfare of her Colo­nies. The British-North-American Provinces will, consequently, be enabled to supply our West-India Islands with fish and lumber, without the dread of any competition from their American neighbors in these branches of com­merce. Prospects so encouraging will, I doubt not, be taken advantage of by the industries and enterprising inhabitants of Nova Scotia.”

Address of the Lieutenant-Governor, Nova Scotia, 1816.


“The youth of the province are daily quitting the fishing stations, and seeking employment on board United States vessels, conducting them to the best fish­ing grounds, carrying on trade and traffic for their new employers with the inhabitants, and injuring their native country by defrauding its revenue, diminishing the operative class, and leaving the aged and infirm to burthen the community they have forsaken and deserted.”

Journals of the Assembly, Nova Scotia, 1837.

Innis, Harold A. Cod Fisheries: The History of an International Economy. University of Toronto Press, 1954. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3138/j.ctv5j037r.

“The Rise of Nova Scotia, 1783-1838, Nova Scotia and Confederation, 1838-1886”.
https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.3138/9781487586256-013/html, https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.3138/9781487586256-015/pdf

Constitutional Conventions, The Heart of the Living Constitution


Constitutional conventions significantly shape how Canada’s constitution functions, often filling legal gaps and defining political authority. They govern the prime minister’s role and the operation of responsible government, transferring decision-making authority from legal frameworks to political actors. Conventions also restrict the legitimate use of legal powers, as seen with the governor general’s limited discretion in appointing cabinet members. Interestingly, some conventions contradict legal duties, like the governor general’s failure to send legislation copies to the British government since 1942. Despite their importance, Canadian courts and scholars have overlooked conventions, misunderstanding their nature and origin.

Relying on historical precedents in constitutional matters can be effective, but problematic when in conflict. Political precedents might be absent, outdated, or contradictory, leading to dilemmas about the existence and interpretation of rules. The Jennings test, often used to determine conventions’ binding nature, works best for those arising from consistent political practice. Trudeau’s attempt to unilaterally patriate the constitution highlights the tension between unilateralism and constitutional conventions, demonstrating the complexities of internal morality in governance.


“Constitutional conventions play a key role in how our constitution actually works in practice, redefining the operation of many legal rules in the process. Some conventions fill great vacuums in the law; for example, the office of prime minister remains to this day largely a creation of convention rather than law. Indeed, the whole enterprise of responsible government is essentially defined by convention.

Other conventions transfer political authority for decisions away from the legal decision maker; most of the powers of the governor general and lieutenant governors, for instance, are exercised in practice by the prime minister and cabinet. Some conventional rules limit the circumstances in which a legal power may legitimately be used; the governor general’s power to appoint and replace members of the cabinet at will are strongly circumscribed and must be used to ensure that the incumbents have or are likely to win the confidence of the House of Commons. A few conventions even negate legal powers or duties; while the governor general has a clear duty under s.56 of the Constitution Act, 1867 to send copies of all legislation passed by Parliament to the British government, this duty has not been followed since 1942. Given the central role of conventions to the Canadian system of government, it is perhaps curious that Canadian courts and legal scholars have given relatively little consideration to them. Of more concern, however, is that much of the attention that has been paid to conventions seriously misconstrues their nature and genesis.”

“A reliance on historical precedents is a bit like trying to navigate by the stars. It is all well and good in a clear sky, but the heavens are not always obliging. The sky may be entirely clouded over, or large patches of the sky may be covered. Similarly, political precedents work wonderfully when they exist and when one can tell which precedents are relevant to our constitutional navigation. But historical precedents can be completely missing, date from a bygone era, or contradict one another. If one searches for a rule among historical events, a number of dilemmas arise from conflicting precedents. Does the contradictory evidence demonstrate that no binding rule exists? Is there a rule, but is one or more of the actors mistaken in assessing its terms? Did one rule give way to another higher rule? Finally, did the actors knowingly breach the rule, but publicly deny its existence, as an act of political self-interest? Another issue is whether one considers both positive and negative precedents. Sometimes, what did not happen and why can be just as revealing, or even more so, than what has happened. It is quite erroneous to conclude that the absence of a clear line of consistent precedents demonstrates that political actors are not bound by convention.The Jennings test really works best for those conventions which arise from consistent political practice and develop into convention. While many conventions do arise this way, others do not. As noted below, conventions can arise through express agreement among all the relevant actors or even by unilateral declaration. Quite a few conventions are also the result of inconsistent, antiquated, or only missing precedents.”

[Unilateralism – it seems very “Canadian” that they’d give “dictatorship” a new name and then legitimize it as a political tradition. Unilateralism is a political tradition but usually in an international context, that each province relates to each other as foreign in many ways is apparent in the way “federalism” has been redefined in the Canadian context, such as with what “free trade” has been redefined to mean. Everything has its exception.]

“Pierre Trudeau’s attempted unilateral patriation is an excellent example of conventions as critical morality. Despite Trudeau’s avowed defence of unilateralism at the time of his proposal, the larger political community and a majority of the Supreme Court clearly held that unilateral changes to provincial powers unconstitutionally undermined the federal principle. Perhaps more telling about the perils of relying on internal morality, Pierre Trudeau pursued the unilateral patriation of the Constitution despite the fact that, as he later acknowledged, he knew there to be a convention requiring provincial consent. After the Supreme Court published their decision in the Patriation Reference, Trudeau told reporters that the Court simply confirmed what the government had held all along, that it had the legal authority to proceed unilaterally even “though there is a political convention or practice that such a request not be made without the agreement of the provincial governments.”

“Constitutional Conventions, The Heart of the Living Constitution”, Heard Andrew. https://www.academia.edu/26337220/Constitutional_Conventions_The_Heart_of_the_Living_Constitution

“A chart of the coast of America from New found Land to Cape Cod”

“Sesembre” or Sambro, which is at the mouth of Halifax Harbor. I’m not sure if “Baye Senne” then is meant to represent it or another subsequent indentation in a coast that is nothing but indentations and harbors, but it does serve as a reference point that’s noted on other maps, much like the Bay of Many Islands (Toutes Isles).

“New Scot Land” and “Accadia”

“A chart of the coast of America from New found Land to Cape Cod”, Seller, John. London. 1675. https://collections.leventhalmap.org/search/commonwealth:3f462s922

Ochterloney Street, Preston Road, No. 7 Highway

From The Story of Dartmouth, by John P. Martin:

The names of Ochterloney and Quarrell (now Queen) were commemorated by streets in downtown Dartmouth. The extension of the first named thoroughfare marked the beginnings of the present no. 7 highway.

Ochterloney Street at the harbor, second street from right above, what is now Alderney Drive travelling horizontally along the shore. Seth Coleman owned the land to the north side on both sides of Alderney at Ochterloney.

Below, “Ferry” marks the foot of Ochterloney Street where John Skerry was the proprietor, while what is now Victoria Road serves as the northern extent of the town plot.

“Peninsula and harbour of Halifax”, 1808. https://cityofdartmouth.ca/peninsula-and-harbour-of-halifax/

From the old town-plot boundary, (Ochterloney Street) veered to the north beyond Pine Street. Opposite the Greenvale Apartments, the antique stone-house demolished only recently, and apparently built “on the bias”, probably fronted the original line of Ochterloney Street as it continued through the property, now occupied by the Nova Scotia Light and Power plant, and headed for the millstream flowing from the lakes. This road then bridged the stream near the western end of the circular-dam [which then did not exist] and ran diagonally to the rise of Prince Albert Road, just below Hawthorne St. Mounded evidence of this route used to be exposed whenever Sullivan’s Pond was drained.

“Map of the Town of Dartmouth”, 1878. https://archives.novascotia.ca/maps/archives/?ID=1000&Page=201402082

The original road beyond the Sinclair Estate at First Lake is the Preston Road, the path as seen below, located above Prince Albert Road, though the ROW ends abruptly before Cottage Hill Drive.

Looking west towards Sullivan’s Pond.

At Silver’s Hill, the slope no doubt originally extended down to the lake shore. Pioneer trails generally avoided lowlands. Hence this “new” road to Preston followed the broad path still seen on the hillside below Sinclair Street, until it emerged around the bend at that bay of the lake called by the Mi’kmaq “Hooganinny Cove”.

This map shows the (old) Preston Road up above, the lower road or the “Road made by the Canal Company” is the present day Prince Albert Road at Silver’s Hill, the left edge of the map being near where Cranston Avenue is today if it were to continue through Benview to meet with Prince Albert Road. “Hooganinny Cove” would be at bottom left. “Dartmouth”, 5 September 1877. https://archives.novascotia.ca/maps/archives/?ID=963.

The causeway-bridge over Carter’s Pond at the town limits, was very likely built during the time of the Maroons, for the road is shown on military maps as early as 1808, indicating that this section of highway had been constructed some years previously.

At left Ochterloney Street labelled as Portland Street, First Red Bridge as mentioned below is seen between Hurley and Elliots at (what was once) Carter’s Pond, “Cottage Hill” subdivision at right didn’t come to pass, at least not as originally planned. “Preston Road” is shown with a notation “Canal Co road 1832” while the old “Preston Road”, the high road, is noted and dated 1815. Martin also notes a “Preston Road of 1797” which must have been the original path considering it was 1796 when the Jamaican Maroons settled Preston Township.

From the vermilion color of the protective wooden railing, this crossing was long known as “First Red Bridge” to distinguish it from “Second Red Bridge” with similarly colored railing, built about 1826 across the bay of Lake Mic Mac near Miller’s Mountain.

What is now Prince Albert Road, what was once the Preston Road. Its path continued to the right at Graham’s corner to what is now Main Street and eventually the Number 7 highway. To the left at Graham’s Corner what is now Braemar Drive. The nook in the lake that Graham’s corner once navigated, what was recently the Mic Mac Rotary is examined separately here. More on Main Street here, at the top of the map is the continuance of the “Road to Preston” in the 1820s.

Green Lane, Old Ferry Road, Lawrencetown Road

old ferry road

Here is one of, if not the earliest plans available showing Old Ferry Road as far as Cole Harbour (at left), which was originally known as the road to Lawrencetown. Now, Old Ferry Road, Portland Street and Cole Harbour Road. A few modern features added at right to give context. More on this road as it traversed through Woodlawn in the 1780s and 1820s.

The initial construction of this road, at least the part beyond the hill according to Martin, is noted in the Halifax Gazette on June 8th, 1754:

Thursday the 16th past, the Settlers of Lawrence Town set out from this Town in order to go by Land for that Place, having a strong Guard of 200 Regular Troops, exclusive of Officers, commanded by Capt. Stone, with a Number of Rangers; which Place they arrived at the Saturday following, having made a Road from Dartmouth Side to the said Town, which is but little more than 11 Miles distance from us…

From The Story of Dartmouth, by John P. Martin:

Old Ferry Inn. Farmers stabled horses here, and sailed to Halifax with produce. Road in foreground extended easterly to the Passage. This sketch was made about 1820.

This is the lower part of Old Ferry Road, once known as “Green Lane” The curve in the foreground leads to the Old Ferry Wharf. The fence on the left encloses the South End Lawn Tennis Courts, and from there to the shore stood Regal willow trees. Two of them were named for King George III and Queen Charlotte, and two others for Mr. and Mrs. James Creighton of “Brooklands” who had them planted perhaps in the late 1700’s. When this picture was taken about 1900, they were of an enormous size. The whole road was a beautiful shady walk from the wharf all the way up to the present Portland Street.

The fence on the right borders Dr. Parker’s fields at “Beechwood”, and ran along near the location of the new house at 71 Newcastle Street.

The route of the obliterated road to the shore is identified by manholes of the sewer pipe running to Parker’s Wharf.

The remains of what used to be the Old Ferry Wharf at the foot of Old Ferry Road still remain visible, particularly at a very low tide – seen here the morning after Hurricane Juan:

“A correct map of the coast of New England”

“New Scotland”, “Annapolis Royal”.


“A large fold-out chart of the New England coast appeared from 1732 to 1760 in “The English Pilot, The Fourth Book”, the standard 18th-century British navigational guide to American waters … Reduced from a chart published in 1729 by Boston ship captain and America’s earliest chart maker Cyprian Southack, this particular chart shows the northeastern coast from Long Island to New Scotland (Nova Scotia).”

“A correct map of the coast of New England” Page, Thomas, d. 1733, bookseller. Printed for W. and J. Mount, T. Page and son, on Tower-Hill, MDCCLX [1760] https://collections.leventhalmap.org/search/commonwealth:cj82m0337, https://collections.library.yale.edu/catalog/2046866

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